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I. INTRODUCTION
An employer described his company's efforts to deal with a particular
employee:
We had to tiptoe around for fear of somehow setting her off and
causing her to blow up on us. Her behavior was sometimes
extremely emotional, bordering on the irrational, and we took great
pains to work with her in a way that she would remain calm. In this
respect-treating her with kid gloves-she received extra-special
treatment that we extended to no other employees. We had to deal
with her as if she was emotionally disturbed.2
The employee being described sued her employer for employment
discrimination, after being terminated because of her "'confrontational and
irrational behavior with her supervisor,' and her 'incessant conflict with her
fellow employees."' 3  Specifically, she claimed that she was disabled
because she was regarded as having a mental disorder "that substantially
limited her ability" to get along with other people.4 When she brought this
action, she was likely unaware that her suit would become a part of a novel
debate in a progressive and polemical odyssey of law within the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").5
"When President [George] Bush signed the ADA" into law, it was "the
world's first comprehensive civil rights law for people with disabilities.
' 6
2. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (alterations omitted).
3. Id. at 154 (quoting plaintiffs affidavit).
4. Id. at 159. This Comment uses "interacting with others" interchangeably with "getting along
with others."
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Generally, the ADA was implemented to combat
discrimination against disabled individuals because of their disabilities. See id. In this Comment,
only the ADA's application in the employment context will be examined, where covered employers
are prohibited from discriminating against employees and potential employees because of their
disabilities. See id. § 12112. Basically, an employer is prohibited from firing, or failing to hire or
promote an individual because of the individual's disability, whether the disability is real or
perceived. See id.; see also Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (1 1th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that a claim may be maintained on perceived disability). Further, an employer is
required to make reasonable accommodations proportional to the needs warranted by the employee's
disability. See § 12112.
6. 148 CONG. REC. E1398-02 (2002) (statement of Rep. Costello). The ADA is applicable in
many contexts, including "employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 (2000).
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The signing, "in front of 3,000 people on the White House lawn on July 26,
1990," laid an important foundation in America's commitment to full and
equal opportunity for all of its citizens.7 But less than two months after the
signing, House Representative William E. Dannemeyer noted that legal
seminars educating employers, employees, and potential employees on the
application of the ADA had "already begun to proliferate. 8 Representative
Dannemeyer added, "I guarantee that the number of perverse and unintended
results will proliferate [from the ADA] as well." 9
This Comment will address the controversial, evolved, and continually
growing issue of what exactly the scope of employment protection under the
ADA is, as set forth by Congress, regulated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and interpreted by the federal courts.
Specifically, this Comment will consider whether "interacting with
others" is properly regarded as a major life activity under the ADA, such
that an impairment, which prevents an employee from being able to interact
or get along with others, is properly included in the definition of "disability."
Or does the classification of such an individual as disabled belong in the
category of "perverse and unintended results," as forecasted by
Representative Dannemeyer? And if the inability to interact with others is
deserving of ADA protection, to what extent and in what circumstances
should it be protected?
This Comment recognizes and appreciates the varying interpretations
and applications of the ADA resulting from language ambiguities and gaps,
and the subsequent struggle that federal courts and administrative agencies
face in adjudicating ADA employment issues.
Throughout the discussion, particular attention will be paid to: 1) the
history and background of the ADA and the EEOC; 2) the EEOC's legal
authority to set parameters for application of the ADA; 3) the current split
within the federal court system and recent Supreme Court guidance; and 4)
the impact, particularly on employers, of accepting "interacting with others"
as a major life activity.
7. Id. Near the time of the signing, there were numerous statements made, lauding the inception
of the ADA and its future possibilities: "[T]oday is a day to rejoice both for the millions of disabled
Americans who, because of ADA, will enter a new era and for the Congress of the United States and
the President whose collaborative efforts led to the passage of this milestone law." 136 CONG. REC.
H5631-04 (1990) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). Senator Tom Harkin said that when the ADA was
approved by the Senate, "[i]t was the proudest day of [his] life." Mary McGrory, For the Disabled,
a Capital Day, WASH. POST, May 27, 1990, at BOI, available at 1990 WL 2129397. "The matter
[was] personal to him. He Chad] a deaf brother who was sent to the Iowa School for the Deaf and
Dumb where students were taught one of three trades: baker, printer or cobbler." Id.
8. 136 CONG. REC. E2939-01 (1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
9. Id.
775
II. HISTORY
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA ")
Recognizing the need for protection of an often disregarded class of
individuals, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation
Act"). ' In an effort to prevent discriminatory treatment of disabled
individuals, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no individual
"shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.""
Although the Rehabilitation Act was lauded by disabled rights activists, it
did not reach the private sector.1 2 However, eighteen years later Congress
enacted the ADA so that private employers would be subject to similar rules
and standards as set forth by the Rehabilitation Act. 3
The first two purposes of the ADA are 1) "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;" and 2) "to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."'
' 4
These two purposes clash with recent sentiments expressed by Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justices do not usually articulate their
views on particular legislation outside of their judicial context; however,
Justice O'Connor recently delivered a speech at the Georgetown University
Law Center addressing the ADA.' 5 In her March 14, 2002 speech she
suggested that Congress passed the ADA in haste, which resulted in sloppily
constructed statutory language.'
6
The fact that "clear" is a characteristic requirement of the purposes of
the ADA is significant, in light of Justice O'Connor's recent criticism of the
ADA for its lack of clarity. Has the congressional directive that ADA
standards and provisions be "clear" been fulfilled since its inception to its
10. 29 U.S.C §§ 701-794e (2000).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
12. See id.
13. Id. § 794(d). In fact, Congress and the Supreme Court dictate that the ADA shall "grant at
least as much protection" to qualified individuals as the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)
(2000); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624. 632 (1998) (noting that the Court is directed to construe
the ADA "to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act").
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
15. William C. Smith, DRAWING BOUNDARIES: The Supreme Court is Siding with Employers
and Narrowing the Reach of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Is That What its Drafters Had in
Mind?, 88 A.B.A. J. 49 (2002).
16. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the ADA is "an example of what happens when the sponsors
are so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn't been as carefully written as a group of
law professors might put together. So it leaves lots of ambiguities and gaps and things for courts to
figure out." Id. The author added that the speech appeared to not only recognize the ambiguity and
lack of clarity in the language of the ADA, but also that the Court's intention to remedy such
ambiguities is growing. See id.
776
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current state of force? How has the ADA changed and expanded its reach in
the last decade?
First, it is important to understand the seeds of purpose that were planted
in drafting the ADA. Before the ADA was passed, there were numerous
debates and inexhaustible lobbying in favor of the act.17 Many of those who
were lobbying were not professional lobbyists, politicians, or even public
interest groups; rather they were the very individuals the ADA designed to
protect-the disabled. 8
It is interesting to note that these individuals with disabilities who were
visiting congressional offices on Capitol Hill were naturally en route with
their wheelchairs, canes, walkers, and crutches.' 9 However, among the
disabled lobbyists, there was no mention of disgruntled employees with
social interaction problems; nor were there individuals with less than
amiable personalities or attitudes, complaining about not finding work
because they were limited in their ability to get along with others.2 °
But while it is true that the public perception of the ADA was initially
centered on those individuals with obvious, physical disabilities, those
individuals with mental disabilities were also part of the 43 million
Americans with disabilities whom Congress acknowledged in the first words
of the ADA.2' The inclusion of mental disabilities within the ADA's scope
of protection gave rise to the issue that is the subject of this Comment.
Congress, in drafting the ADA, set forth simple and short parameters.
In particular, the ADA defines the term "disability," with respect to an
individual, as (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual"; (2) "a record of
such an impairment"; or (3) "being regarded as having such an
impairment. ' 22 Congress chose not to elaborate further on the definition of
17. McGrory, supra note 7, at B01.
18. See id.
19. See id. The disabled individuals were hoping to make impressions with members of
Congress by "displaying dignity and charm, trying to convince members that even people who can
only drool are capable of astonishing expression, and making one point over and over: We don't
want pity, we want work." Id.
20. See id. Interestingly, an employment law scholar and practicing attorney went to great
lengths to make this point clear. In an article in the Lex Mentis column of the Employee Relations
Law Journal entitled "The Americans With Difficult Personalities Act," James J. McDonald, Jr.
satirized a particular ADA claim. 25 EMPLOYEE REL. L. REV. 93 (2000). The article noted that by
the year 2000, emotional or psychological difficulties accounted for the greatest number of ADA
claims, and discussed a particular ADA plaintiff, who unsuccessfully sued her employer after being
placed on permanent disability for having numerous emotional outbursts with her supervisor and
coworkers. id. Ironically, the unsuccessful ADA plaintiff was once again unsuccessful, in a suit
against Professor McDonald for defamation. See Misek-Falkoff v. McDonald, 177 F. Supp. 2d 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000). Specifically, Congress found that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older[.]" Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). The same definition is promulgated at 29 C.F.R. §
disability and chose not to explain the meanings of "impairment,"
"substantially limits," or "major life activities."23  Causes of action are
viable only for a qualified individual with a disability, which means an
"individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience,
education and other job-related requirements of the employment position
such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. ' 24
With the ADA enacted, was that all Congress was required to do? Did
Congress leave the courts and administrative enforcement agencies in the
lurch by not being more lucid with its intent? Justice O'Connor's
explanation of why there is lack of clarity in the language and application of
the ADA may be accurate,25 but regardless of Congress' reasoning (or lack
thereof) for not further clarifying key terms, these gaps and ambiguities soon
began to be interpreted in a variety of ways.26
Mental disability issues have a tendency to be more difficult to
adjudicate because of the rapidly evolving fields of psychiatry and
psychology, as well as the lack of understanding of these fields by
individuals generally.27 Thus, it is indeed a dubious task for courts,
agencies, and employers to understand mental impairments without clarity
of intent offered by Congress. This concept is rather new, and has been
teething for the last seven years.28
What gave rise to the initial claim that the inability to get along with
others may give rise to a disability under the ADA? This idea did not come
from Congress, the courts, or even an opportunistic plaintiff's attorney;
rather, it was officially promulgated by the EEOC.
1630.2(g)(1)-(3) (2002), as recognized by the EEOC. There are two possible sources of guidance for
applying and understanding this definition-the regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988), and the EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA. See Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002). Congress defined disability "almost
verbatim from the definition of "handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act, § 706(8)(B), and
Congress' repetition of a well-established term generally implies that Congress intended the term to
be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations." Toyota Motor Mfg., 534
U.S. at 193-94. "No agency, however, has been given authority to issue regulations implementing
the generally applicable provisions of the ADA ... which fall outside Titles I-V." Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999). The Court also noted that no agency has "authority to
interpret the term disability." Id.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2002). See § 1630.3 for exceptions to this definition, including drug
addiction, gambling, sexual deviancies, and other problems. "Essential functions" is defined as "the
fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.
The term 'essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)( I) (2002).
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IV.A, discussing the split within the circuit courts.
27. See Tami A. Earnhart, Note, Medicated Mental Impairments Under the ADA: Diagnosing the
Problem, Prescribing the Solution, 74 IND. L.J. 251, 267-68 (1998) (suggesting that the subjectivity
of mental impairments, and the lack of understanding of such impairments by the layperson. such as
an employer or a judge, complicates the analysis).
28. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric
Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
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B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
The EEOC was established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196429 to procedurally regulate its provisions combating employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 °
The EEOC was later charged by Congress in 1990 to promulgate
regulations applying the provisions of Title I of the ADA.3' Congress
directed the EEOC to have its regulations in place one year before the
ADA's effective date. 32 Among the regulations set forth by the EEOC is the
definition of "major life activities. 33 The regulation states that "major life
activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. 34  Further, Congress provided for causes of action against
violations of EEOC regulations.35
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000). The EEOC proceeded to define key terms found in the preamble
to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2002). It is crucial to note that
the EEOC's interpretation of these particular terms deals with a part of the ADA that technically is
not delegated to the EEOC to interpret (i.e., it is not within Title I). See discussion infra Section III
(discussing the EEOC's interpretive authority). Specifically, the EEOC defined "physical or mental
impairment" as "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)(2)
(2002). For purposes here, attention will be given primarily to mental impairment, but it is
noteworthy that further definitions of physical or mental impairment include: "[a]ny physiological
disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine." § 1630.2(h)(1). Further, The EEOC states than an individual is "substantially
limited" if he or she is:
[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population
can perform that same major life activity.
§ 1630.20)(l)(i)-(ii).
32. See id. The directive that the EEOC have its regulations set forth before the ADA's
enactment date perhaps suggests that the regulations would be relied upon by employees and
employers for clear guidance with respect to their rights and responsibilities. See Rebecca Hanner
White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MiCH. L. REV. 532, 551-53 (2000) (arguing in
favor of granting deference to EEOC regulations); see also discussion infra Section III (discussing
deference due to EEOC regulations).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 12102(i) (2002).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000). The EEOC laid out examples, but neither Congress nor the
EEOC specifically defined major life activities, providing little guidance in determining how
inclusive or exclusive the "list" of acceptable major life activities should be. See discussion infra
Section III (relating to the deference to be given to EEOC regulations and subsequent interpretive
guidelines).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1630.2(a) (2000). Specifically, an ADA claimant must exhaust
administrative remedies within the EEOC before filing suit in federal district court, and then must
file suit within a specified time period after a right to sue letter has been issued by the EEOC. See
779
After several. years of extensively interpreting the employment
provisions of the ADA and enforcing claims, the EEOC further interpreted
the language and intent of the ADA, issuing an Enforcement Guidance
("Guidance") to help clarify employee rights and employer obligations,
specifically with respect to emotional or psychological impairments.36 In the
manual, the EEOC classifies "interacting with others" as a major life
activity.
37
In light of the EEOC's evolving interpretations of the language and
intent of the ADA, and the subsequent deference that courts have tended to
grant the EEOC,38 it is important to look at whether or not the EEOC may
properly interpret the ADA in a manner that is binding, or at least
persuasive, on the courts.
III. DOES THE EEOC HAVE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF
MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES?
Notwithstanding Congress's directive that the EEOC issue regulations
implementing and enforcing the ADA, the actual authority of the EEOC to
interpret the provisions of the ADA is less than clear.
The Supreme Court stated, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,39 that
although the EEOC has attempted to clarify the terms of the ADA, Congress
has given no agency authority to issue regulations interpreting the term
'disability' in the ADA.4 ° In Sutton, although the Court expressed doubt as
to the authoritative weight of EEOC regulations, it nevertheless found no
id. See also White, supra note 32, for the proposition that, in granting causes of action for EEOC
violations, Congress effectively conferred lawmaking authority on the EEOC; see discussion infra
Section II (discussing deference due to EEOC regulations).
36. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric
Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
37. Id. at n. 15. The Guidance notes that interacting with others is not substantially limiting "just
because an individual is irritable or has some trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker,"
but would require severe problems relating to others on a regular basis, such as "consistently high
levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary." ld at n.15; id. at
Question 9.
38. The Second Circuit stated that it will continue to give weight to EEOC regulations "until a
more definite pronouncement [from the Supreme Court] is forthcoming." Muller v. Costello, 187
F.3d 298, 312 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Ross v. Campbell Soup Co.. 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir.
2001) (deferring to legislative purpose and subsequent EEOC interpretive regulations to find a clear
intent to include working to be a major life activity within the contemplation of the ADA); Colwell
v. Suffolk County Police Dep't., 158 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the major life
activities promulgated by EEOC regulations are "major life activities per se," and that major life
activities are assessed within the contemplation of the purposes of the ADA, rather than whether the
activity is important to a particular ADA plaintiff); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing circuit court
split). But see infra Part III (questioning EEOC authority).
39. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
40. Id. at 479. The Court noted that the EEOC only has authority to regulate Title I of the ADA,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000), concluding that because the statutory definition of
disability is found in the preamble to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, the EEOC does not have such
broad interpretive authority. Id. Although the Court recognized this lack of interpretive authority, it
nevertheless applied EEOC regulations that interpret and elaborate on the meaning of disability. Id.
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occasion to assess the validity or weight of EEOC authority to promulgate
regulations interpreting the ADA.'
The Court held, the same day, in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,42 that
because the parties stipulated to the interpretive guidance offered by the
EEOC regulations, it was not necessary to determine whether the regulations
were binding.43
The Court was faced with a similar situation in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams." The Court once again punted
on the direct question of what deference, if any, is due to EEOC regulations
interpreting the provisions of the ADA.45 The Court explained that if the
EEOC does not have license to define or magnify ADA terms, then the
terms must "retain only their plain meaning in the language of the statute. 4 6
Although the EEOC was implored by Congress to regulate and interpret
Title I of the ADA, no express delegation of power to interpret any other
part of the ADA was granted.4 7 However, it is important to consider
questions of deference to the EEOC in light of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 8 There, the Court held that conferring rulemaking authority to a
regulatory agency, such as the EEOC, where Congress has enacted an
ambiguous statute, constitutes a delegation of interpretive authority to that
agency.49
The Chevron Court set forth a two-step analysis for courts to apply.
First, courts should look to whether Congress has clearly "spoken to the
41. Id. at 480. The Court did not address the issue of the EEOC's authority interpreting the
regulations because it was not dispositive to the case. See id.
42. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
43. Id. at 563 n.10.
44. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
45. Id. at 194 (holding that because the litigants accepted "the EEOC regulations as reasonable,"
the Court would "assume without deciding that they are [reasonable]").
46. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478. 482 (1990) (stating that when statutory language is
clear, the court must look no further than that language to determine the statute's meaning): see also
Mary Nebgen, Note, Narrowing the Class of Individuals with Disabilities: Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc.. 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1129 (2000). Disregarding clarifications made by the EEOC of
ADA terms will likely have an insignificant effect on future ADA decisions. Id. at 1160.
Specifically, the "EEOC's amplification and explanation of the term 'physical or mental
impairment' simply provides examples of conditions which could be disabilities if they were
substantially limiting in a major life activity. The definition of 'substantially limits' provides a
parameter against which to evaluate whether the condition is truly substantially limiting." Id. at
1160-61. Because neither Congress nor the EEOC has defined "major life activities," the non-
exhaustive list of examples of major life activities, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2002), seems to give rise to
interpretation by way of analogy.
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000) (granting the EEOC regulatory powers limited to the
parameters of Title I only).
48. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court assessed whether the Environmental Protection
Agency had authority to interpret ambiguous language in the Clean Air Act. See generally id.
49. Id. at 842-43.
precise question at issue., 50 The inquiry ends "[i]f the intent of Congress is
clear.... ." The court and the agency must defer to the clear intent of
Congress. 5' But if Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court may not impose its own construction on the statute.52 The
second step of the Chevron analysis requires the court to ask "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. '53 If
the agency's construction is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute," then it is likely permissible.54 Regulations passing the
Chevron test are afforded controlling weight.
Congress likely recognized that drafting the ADA with less-than explicit
terms, and subsequently granting regulatory powers to the EEOC, would
judicially require Chevron-style deference to be given to EEOC regulations
where the language of the ADA is ambiguous.5 6 Thus, applying Chevron
reasoning to the EEOC's interpretation of "major life activities," the relevant
inquiry is whether the language that Congress chose is ambiguous in its
construction or intent.
Specifically, the statutory language of the ADA speaks of an
"impairment that substantially limits ... major life activities," without
defining, explaining, or clarifying the meaning of "major life activities. ' '5 7 Is
there ambiguity in the statutory meaning of "major life activities?" If the
language is indeed ambiguous, then because Congress conferred regulatory
power upon the EEOC to enforce Title I of the ADA, the EEOC regulation
defining major life activities must be afforded Chevron-style deference, but
only if it is a permissible construction of the ADA statutory language.58
However, for purposes of this Comment, the more applicable inquiry
lies beyond what deference is owed to EEOC regulations. Assuming
arguendo that Chevron-style deference is due to the regulation, the EEOC
did not promulgate "interacting with others" as a major life activity in the
regulation; rather it offered this interpretation in its Compliance Manual.59
Accordingly, the question is whether Chevron-style deference is due to the
Manual.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id at 843. "If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 844.
55. See id. As long as the agency's construction is permissible, that there may be other
reasonable interpretations imagined by the Court is irrelevant. Id.
56. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 338-39 (2002)
(finding that because Congress could not anticipate the directions of a particular statute regulated by
the Federal Communications Commission, Congress knew that the FCC would have authority to fill
in the intentionally left gaps in the statutory language).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
58. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
59. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric
Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
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The Supreme Court, in a later decision, addressed this issue. The Court
in Christensen v. Harris County 60 considered what deference, if any, is due
to the acts and language of an administrative agency when not dealing with
its official regulations that are promulgated under instruction by Congress.
6
'
Specifically, the Court considered an administrative interpretation by the
Department of Labor under the Fair Standards Labor Act of 1938
("FSLA")62 "contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after.., a
formal [administrative] adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. 63
The Court found that such interpretations-"like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, [641 all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-
style deference. 65  The Court added that "[ilnstead, interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters [and administrative guidelines
and compliance manuals] are 'entitled to respect' under our decision in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co."' 66 Skidmore-style deference is warranted "only to
the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade[.]"' 67
60. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
61. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
63. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. An opinion letter is an informal letter stating a particular
position of an agency, but it is not part of the agency's regulations. Notice-and-comment
rulemaking is "the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for
which deference is claimed." United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
64. An example is the Manual at issue here, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans
With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych
.html.
65. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995), for the
proposition that an internal agency guideline, which is not "subject to the rigors of the
Administrative Procedure Act, including public notice and comment," is entitled only to "some
deference" (alterations omitted)). See also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58
(1991) (reasoning that interpretative guidelines do not warrant Chevron-style deference); Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (holding that "some
weight" is due to informal interpretations though not "the same deference as norms that derive from
the exercise of ... delegated lawmaking powers").
66. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). But see Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, Nat'l, 192 F.3d 417
(4th Cir. 1999). There, the court afforded Chevron-style deference to an amicus brief filed by the
EEOC on behalf of an ADA plaintiff. Id. at 427. The court reasoned that in light of the particular
circumstances, the "EEOC's position is in no sense a post hoc rationalization advanced to defend its
past action against attack, and there is simply no reason to suspect that the proffered interpretation
does not reflect the EEOC's fair and considered judgment on the statutory interpretation questions at
hand." Id. An amicus brief given Chevron-style deference is a large step from granting Chevron-
style deference to regulations implemented by regulatory agencies. This suggests that agency
interpretations, other than official regulations, may be afforded deference under Chevron, but this
idea, and Jones itself, seem to be in severe conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Christensen.
67. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. The Court cited Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, where it stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
However, a further distinction is necessary to recognize. In Christensen,
the Department of Labor's administrative opinion letter was offering
guidance regarding the FSLA, which was not even remotely suggested by
the actual regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. 68 Thus, the
Department of Labor was not interpreting statutory language of the FSLA;
rather, it had interpreted its own regulations (which were promulgated under
authority granted by Congress) in the form of an opinion letter.69
There is a significant difference in application of deference where an
administrative agency is interpreting its own regulation as opposed to when
an agency is interpreting the statutory language of an act of Congress. The
Court noted that when an agency is interpreting its own regulation, it may be
entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins.70  However, this deference is
due the interpretation only when the regulation it is interpreting is itself
ambiguous.7 To otherwise defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation would be to "permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create defacto a new regulation. '7 2
Now, the relevant inquiry for purposes of this Comment is what
deference is owed to the EEOC Compliance Manual. Chevron-style
deference is clearly not warranted for the EEOC Manual because the Court
specifically excludes interpretive guidance, opinion letters, and compliance
manuals from the application of Chevron-style deference.73 If the EEOC's
Manual is interpreting the ADA's statutory language, then Skidmore-style
deference is due to the EEOC interpretation, to the extent that it has the
power to persuade.74  If it is interpreting its own regulation defining major
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
68. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587-88.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 588 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). In Auer, the Court held that
the Secretary of Labor reasonably interpreted its own regulation as denying exempt status to
employees who were covered by policy permitting disciplinary or pay deductions from their salaries
as a practical matter. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
71. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron-style deference).
Although the EEOC Manual is not under the protection of Chevron, EEOC regulations themselves
may be deserving of Chevron-style deference, but only where the statutory language that the EEOC
is interpreting is ambiguous. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
declined to rule on whether EEOC regulations are deserving of Chevron-style deference in Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The Court stated: "[I]t is enough to observe that the
well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' id. at 598
(quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)). But see Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142
F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that EEOC regulations defining ADA terms, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2, are entitled to Chevron-style deference because of the ambiguity in certain ADA
statutory language and the EEOC's authority to enforce the ADA). The Third Circuit later added in
Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999), that its grant of Chevron-
style deference to EEOC regulations was limited to the interpretation of ambiguous language in Title
I of the ADA and did not necessarily apply to interpretation of the preambles of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12102 (2000), which is the location of the ADA's first mention of major life activities.
74. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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life activities, then the interpretation is due Auer-style deference, such that it
is controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation," but only if its regulation is itself ambiguous.' 5
Chevron-style deference and Auer-style deference are very similar in
application. Chevron requires that the regulation be given deference unless
it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute[,] ' ' 76 while
Auer requires that the guidance interpreting the ambiguous regulation is
controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.,
77
There have been numerous theories regarding the deference owed to
EEOC regulations and subsequent interpretive guidance. In fact, the
question of what deference is owed to EEOC interpretations has not been
conclusively determined by the Supreme Court or delineated by Congress.
Although the circuit courts have attempted to reconcile the different
standards of deference and cleanly apply them to the EEOC (and other
regulatory agencies), it is not a clean process or a clear issue.
It is conceivable that EEOC Guidance should be afforded Auer-style
deference where it is interpreting ambiguous EEOC regulations. 78 However,
if this is the correct analysis, the question still remains of whether EEOC
regulations generally, ambiguous or clear, deserve judicial deference of any
kind. Until the Supreme Court rules on this issue, the lower courts will
likely continue applying their individual theories and deference tests, which
despite their differences, are all couched in the same idea in which
everything in the law is couched: reasonableness.79
In any event, Skidmore's common-sense reasoning should prevail, even
in the vast, intricate, and often sloppy quagmire of interaction between
administrative agencies and the judiciary:
Good administration of the Act and good judicial administration
alike require that the standards of public enforcement and those for
determining private rights shall be at variance only where justified
by very good reasons. The fact that the Administrator's policies
75. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
359 (1945)).
76. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
77. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 359).
78. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000). Specifically, the question at
hand must be whether the regulation laying out the illustrative list of major life activities is itself
ambiguous such that the Manual's interpretation of it is appropriate under Auer.
79. The pure thought and theory of the deference doctrines is somewhat distorted by different
courts' uses and tests. See discussion infra Section IV.A analyzing various circuit court decisions.
See White, supra note 32, for a thorough and clear analysis of deference owed to the EEOC in
regulating and interpreting employment claims under the ADA.
785
and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not
mean that they are not entitled to respect.8 °
Additionally, although the EEOC's compliance manual initially
spawned ADA plaintiffs' realization that they might have claims based on an
inability to interact with others, courts have added their own classifications
of "major life activities," even in the absence of EEOC language specifically
suggesting the propriety of a particular major life activity.
For example, the Supreme Court added a major life activity to the list in
Bragdon v. Abbott.8  The Court held that reproduction is a major life
activity under the ADA, adding to the illustrative, non-exhaustive list of
major life activities provided by the EEOC.82  The Court found it
unnecessary to analyze in-depth the characteristics of what constitutes a
major life activity because "[p]etitioner advance[d] no credible basis" for the
83Court to reach a contrary decision.
The Court deferred to the regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, which
supply a non-exhaustive list of major life activities (which is identical to the
list found in the EEOC provisions interpreting the ADA).84 The Court
reasoned that "since reproduction could not be regarded as any less
important than working," which is recognized by EEOC regulations as a
major life activity, the former must be included as a major life activity.85
The Court further explained that reproduction is "central to the life process
itself.
8 6
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,87
concluded that a reasonable jury could find that an employee, who had a
spastic colon and subsequent problems controlling her bowels, was
substantially limited in the major life activity of controlling one's bowels. 88
Conversely, courts have concluded, without EEOC guidance, that
certain activities do not constitute major life activities. For example, courts
have held that attending day care,89 gardening, golfing, and shopping are not
major life activities. 90 Examples of more employment-related activities that
have been held not to be major life activities are tardiness and laziness. 9
80. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
81. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
82. See id. at 638-39 (referring to 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31 (b)(2)
(1997)).
83. Id. at 639.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 638.
87. 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 467. The court did not defer to the EEOC to make this finding because the EEOC
regulations do not include "controlling one's bowels" in the non-exhaustive list of major life
activities; rather, in light of reason and experience it is an activity that is of extreme and obvious
significance to an individual. See id.
89. See Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[m]ajor life activities do
not include those activities like day care attendance that, although important to a particular plaintiff,
are not significant within the contemplation of the ADA" (citing Colwell v. Suffolk County Police
Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1998))).
90. See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 643; see also Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.
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An example of a lower court interpreting the ADA, even in terms that
are non-specific to the EEOC, is the Tenth Circuit decision holding that a
major life activity must be "a basic activity that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty., 92 Clearly, courts
are not impotent without the aid of EEOC regulations or interpretive
guidance. Accordingly, although EEOC regulations may be persuasive,
helpful, or completely confusing and non-authoritative, the courts assert
their own interpretive powers, thereby adding to the already murky waters in
which the EEOC and the ADA attempt to swim.
IV. CURRENT STATE OF LAW REGARDING WHETHER INTERACTING WITH
OTHERS IS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
A. Circuit Courts are Split on the Issue
1. The First Circuit Determines that Interacting with Others Is Not a
Major Life Activity
The First Circuit was the first to directly consider whether interacting
with others is a valid major life activity under the ADA, in Soileau v.
Guilford of Maine, Inc.93 The plaintiff employee, Soileau, claimed that his
depressive disorder substantially limited him in his ability to get along with
others.94  Soileau worked as a time study analyst in the industrial
engineering department of the defendant employer. 95 He was responsible for
conducting group meetings within his department, the organization of which
was not to the liking of Soileau's new supervisor.96 The supervisor
approached Soileau, and advised him that his "negative attitude" was hurting
his department, as well as his credibility among his coworkers and those
who worked under him.
97
1999). If legal reasoning in this sense is predicated on activities that are important to any particular
individual, the definition of major life activities could include every kind of activity, from running
marathons to shopping, which would be an absurd and unmanageable interpretation of the ADA.
91. See Thomas v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-2283, 1996 WL 583386, at *1 (7th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished disposition); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
92. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
93. 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997). It is important to note that this case occurred after the EEOC
suggested that interacting with others is a major life activity in its 1995 Compliance Manual. The
court acknowledged that the compliance manual is "hardly binding." Id. at 15 n.2 (citing Schmidt v.
Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 1001 (D. Or. 1994)).
94. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 13.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
In fact, the supervisor instructed Soileau to elicit evaluations from his
coworkers regarding his performance, attitude, and what could be done to
make the department better. 98 When the evaluations came back showing
specific problem areas in Soileau's performance and attitude, his supervisor
then instructed Soileau to develop a "plan to address the weaknesses
identified" in the evaluations.99 When Soileau refused to come up with a
plan to combat his apparent work-related problems, and further refused to
perform another, unrelated task, he was placed under suspension.' ° During
this time he was required to develop a plan to address four specific work
deficiencies. 101
This suspension, which would result in termination if he failed to
comply with company requests, proved to be stressful for Soileau, who
advised his employer that he had been suicidal in the past, and feared he was
facing another bout of depression.10 2  Soileau's supervisor subsequently
allowed him to conduct mainly clerical duties and relieved him of his duties
to conduct the department meetings, which were the root of his initial work
problems. 10 3  However, this was not enough: Soileau, through his
psychologist, requested that his "work duties be 'restricted so as to avoid
responsibilities which require significant interaction with other employees,'
and advised that Soileau 'should not be ridiculed, provoked or startled by or
in front of supervisors or other employees."-10
4
The supervisor, feeling that his initial accommodation of relieving
Soileau of conducting department meetings was sufficient, terminated
Soileau because "there had been no improvement in the four problem areas
[identified] and because Soileau had not submitted an improvement plan."'0 5
The court, in holding that interacting with others is not a major life
activity, noted that "[t]he concept of [the] 'ability to get along with others' is
remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a
definition.' 16  The court reasoned that Soileau's alleged inability to get
along with others came and went, and was triggered by common problems of
life that would stress ordinary, non-disabled people.'0 7  Further, that
Soileau's last depressive episode was four years earlier, and that he had no
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 13-14.
102. Id. at 14. Soileau had previously been diagnosed with a depressive disorder. Id. Soileau
visited his long-time psychologist, who recommended, and Soileau agreed, that he should take a
leave of absence to deal with his stress. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court added:
While such an ability is a skill to be prized, it is different in kind from breathing or
walking, two exemplars which are used in the regulations. Further, whether a person has
such an ability may be a matter of subjective judgment; and the ability may or may not
exist, depending on context.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. The court gave examples of such life-problems: "losing a girlfriend or being criticized by
a supervisor." Id.
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problems in the interim, tended to show how the elastic concept of the
inability to get along with others may be affected by time, circumstance, and
context.'0 8  The court, in summation, found that "[tjo impose legally
enforceable duties on an employer based on such an amorphous concept
would be problematic."'109
a. Courts Tending to Follow Soileau
In Amir v. St. Louis University,"° the Eighth Circuit noted that the
plaintiff employee had suffered from an obsessive compulsive disorder that
affected "his ability to eat and drink without vomiting, [and] his ability to
concentrate and learn.. . ." While the court found eating, drinking, and
learning to be major life activities, the court regarded interacting with others
as "questionable" as a major life activity, without further analyzing its
qualities. " 
2
Likewise, in Davis v. University of North Carolina,"3 the court assessed
a claimant's contention that she was removed from a teacher certification
program because she suffered from disassociative identity disorder."14 At
oral argument, counsel for the claimant suggested she was perceived by the
defendant "as being so unable to get along with others that she was
substantially limited in her ability to work.""' 5 The court regarded the
argument as approaching "a claim that the ability to get along with others is
a major life activity, a claim about which we have some doubt."'"1 6
Some district courts have essentially followed the reasoning of Soileau.
For example, in Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc.," 7 an individual who was
diagnosed with depression sought protection under the ADA, claiming a
108. Id. However, the court suggested that "a more narrowly defined concept going to essential
attributes of human communication could, in a particular setting, be understood to be a major life
activity," but acknowledged that such a possibility was beyond the scope of the issue before the
court. Id.
109. Id. The ability to interact with others as a major life activity is, according the court, "an
amorphous concept." Id. Is the court's holding that it is not a major life activity based simply on the
proposition that it is an elastic, amorphous concept? Perhaps if congressional intent were clearer, its
reasoning would be different. Or perhaps it is unreasonable for any court, administrative agency, or
even Congress, to consider the parameters of a legally applicable standard of a disability based on an
"amorphous concept," such as the inability to get along with others. Nevertheless, the court
continued to analyze Soileau's claim, assuming, dubitante, that if getting along with others was a
major life activity, then his allegations would nonetheless fail because he was not substantially
limited in getting along with others. Id. at 15-17.
110. 184 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1999).
111. Id. at1027.
112. Id.
113. 263 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 2001).
114. Id. at 100-01.
115. Id. at 101 n.4.
116. Id. (citing Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)).
117. 976 F. Supp. 858 (D. Minn. 1997).
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substantial limitation in the "normal social interaction with others, or the
ability to get along with others.""1 8 His claim rested on manifestations of his
impairment that took the form of hostile acts and incidents while at work,
including: (1) "blowing-up" at a co-worker; (2) talking about harming
himself on the job; and (3) and threatening and swearing at his group
leader. 119 The court concluded that these activities "[are] not the sort of
activit[ies] within the ADA's purview of ... major life activit[ies]."' 2°
Although noting the EEOC's position in its Compliance Manual accepting
interacting with others as a major life activity, the court reasoned that such
interpretive guidance was "not binding" on the court.
121
2. The Ninth Circuit Holds that Interacting with Others Is a Major Life
Activity
With the First Circuit setting the initial tone for assessing the validity of
interacting with others as a major life activity, the next circuit court to
directly address the issue was the Ninth Circuit in McAlindin v. County of
San Diego. 22  There the court, clearly disregarding Soileau, broke new
ground by being the first circuit court to explicitly declare that interacting
with others is a major life activity. 123
Plaintiff McAlindin was a systems analyst for the County of San Diego
("County"), who had been diagnosed with anxiety and panic disorders, and
was on several medications to regulate his anxiety.12 4  After receiving a
118. Id. at 863.
119. Id. at 860-61.
120. Id. at 863 (citing Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15).
121. Id. For other district court holdings, see, e.g., Salamo Martinez v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 144. 150 (D.P.R. 2003) (citing Soileau, the court found "unavailing [plaintiffs]
allegation that his ability to interact with others is substantially limited"); Hawkins v. Trs. of Indiana
Univ., 83 F. Supp. 2d 987, 995-96 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (citing the lack of authority as reason for
concluding that "interacting with people outside of work" was unlikely to be a major life activity in
and of itself); Stauffer v. Bayer Corp., No. 3:96-CV-661RP, 1997 WL 588890, at *6 (N.D. Ind. July
21, 1997) (noting that "interacting with others" is not listed in EEOC regulations as a major life
activity, and that the plaintiff, an individual with stress-induced adjustment disorder, provided no
authority to support her contention that it should be).
122. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999). To date, the First Circuit in Soileau, and the Ninth Circuit in
McAlindin, are the only circuits to directly assess the validity of interacting with others as a major
life activity. Id.; Solieau, 105 F.3d at 15. Other circuits have suggested reasoning one way or
another, and have made assumptions, arguendo, but have not adjudicated the precise issue on the
merits. See, e.g., Doebele v. Sprint, 342 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003); Cameron v. Cmty. Aid
for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2003); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622,
628-29 (8th Cir. 2003).
123. McAlindin, 192 F.3d. at 1233.
124. Id. at 1230. McAlindin described his condition as follows:
Despite the medications [I take], I continue to experience symptoms so severe that at
least once a month, I am completely incapacitated, and forced to lie down. Symptoms
include dizziness, lightheadedness, narrowed vision, and strange sensations in my head,
and my arms and legs. As a result of the medications, I experience impotence. In
addition ... I have frequently been unable to sleep and have had severe insomnia ....
Without the medication, my symptoms return. If I do not take my medication, I am
unable to function. The frequency and severity of the symptoms increases to the point
where I cannot take care of myself. My condition interferes with my ability to see and
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promotion, McAlindin began to experience higher levels of work-related
stress. 125  The stress proved to be too much for McAlindin, who
subsequently took a leave of absence. 126 Three years later, he took another
stress-related leave of absence.1 27  McAlindin wanted the county either to
extend his leave for more than a year, or to reasonably accommodate him by
providing him with another job.1 28 When neither request was immediately
honored, he returned to his original job after psychological and performance
evaluations. 129  McAlindin alleged that when he returned to his job, he was
mistreated by his supervisors and was not treated the same as other
employees. 3 °
McAlindin then brought suit alleging, inter alia, that the County failed
to make reasonable accommodations for him because of his mental disorders
that limited him in the major life activity of interacting with others. 131
In analyzing McAlindin's claims, the court gave vast deference to
EEOC guidelines, 3 2 holding that he was substantially limited in his ability
to interact with others, and thus the question of whether he was substantially
hear and speak. The sense of anxiety, without medication, is so overwhelming, that I am
unable to do anything. I am essentially "paralyzed."
Id. at 1230-31 (alteration in original).
125. Id. at 1231. McAlindin alleged that he had logged complaints with his supervisors, who in
turn disregarded them. Id. Soon after, McAlindin became extremely agitated and began screaming
at his coworkers during a meeting. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1231. The County would not allow McAlindin to be on leave for
more than one year because it was against policy to do so. Id. Further, the County offered to put
him on a transfer list to a different department, but made it clear that no special treatment would be
afforded to him. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. McAlindin asserted that one of his supervisors wrote him a warning based on his
sleeping at work, which McAlindin tried to explain as being an effect of his medication that made
him drowsy. Id. McAlindin further alleged that he received less training than his coworkers, a point
that was factually disputed. Id. at 123 1-32.
131. Id. at 1233. McAlindin further asserted substantial limitations in the major life activities of
sleeping and sexual relations, based on his insomnia and impotence. Id.
132. Id. at 1233 n.6. The court recognized the arguments advocating that EEOC regulations and
the Manual are not proper authority for interpreting ADA provisions. Id; see supra section III
(discussing authority suggesting that EEOC regulations are not binding). But the court followed
EEOC regulations, pointing out that the parties stipulated to the validity of the regulations, and that
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of EEOC authority. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at
1233 n.6; see also discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
parties' stipulation that EEOC regulations are proper authority for ADA claims, and the Court's
application of EEOC regulations, but its failure to hold that EEOC regulations are persuasive or
binding authority). The court in McAlindin made an unprecedented holding, which included three
specific activities within the definition of major life activities, in large part because the parties
accepted the validity of those regulations. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233 n.6, 1234.
limited in his ability to work (a fairly common and accepted claim) was then
moot. 33
The court relied on two primary pieces of authority for its holding: 1)
the EEOC regulations and Manual and 2) Criado v. IBM Corp.34 The court
acknowledged the reluctance of the First Circuit in Soileau to accept
interacting with others as a major life activity because of the term's
amorphous or vague characteristics. 135  However, the court stated that
"interacting with others is no more vague than 'caring for oneself,' which
has been widely recognized as a major life activity."' 13 6
The court clarified its holding in that recognizing the ability to interact
with others "does not mean that any cantankerous person will be deemed
substantially limited in a major life activity. ' 37  The court added that
"[m]ere trouble getting along with coworkers is not sufficient to show a
substantial limitation. ' ' 38 The court found evidence that, because of
133. Id. at 1233-34. The court cited the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.htm, as
authority for inclusion of the "ability to interact with others" as a major life activity. Id. at 1233.
The court, deferring to the EEOC Guidance, noted that if a major life activity other than working is
applicable, then working shall not be considered in its disability analysis. Id.
134. 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998); see also McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234 (relying on the holding in
Criado). Ironically, the court is supporting its argument with a decision from the First Circuit,
where it was strongly doubted that interacting with others is a major life activity in Soileau. The
court relied on Criado, to the extent that it found a claimant to be disabled because she was
"substantially limited in her ability to work, sleep, and relate to others." McAlindin, 192 F.3d. at
1234 (citing Criado, 145 F.3d at 442). The court in McAlindin sifted out the last small claim in
Criado of the claimant's limitation in "relating to others" to swiftly conclude that "[b]ecause
interacting with others is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing, it easily falls
within the definition of 'major life activity.' McAlindin, 192 F.3d. at 1234. Nothing in Criado
suggests this conclusion, or supports the particular language used in McAlindin, comparing "relating
to others" to walking and breathing, which are widely accepted major life activities. See generally
Criado, 145 F.3d 437. The McAlindin court, however, primarily relied on the EEOC guidelines for
its holding. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233 n.6.
135. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234.
136. See id. at 1235. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(finding that caring for oneself is a major life activity) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2002));
Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); see
also Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining "caring for oneself'
as including everything from driving and grooming to feeding oneself and cleaning one's home).
137. McAlindin, 192 F.3d. at 1235. See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities at n. 15 (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs
/psych.html ("Interacting with others, as a major life activity, is not substantially limited just because
an individual is irritable or has some trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker.").
138. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235. Thus, the court had no hesitation in defining this major life
activity, but clarifies that to be substantially limited requires more specific evidence of impediment
in getting along with others. See id. at 1235-36 (McAlindin's difficulties in interacting with others
were "sufficiently severe" to overcome a summary judgment motion); see also Thornton v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 804 (9th Cir. 2001). In Thornton, the Ninth Circuit
further explained its reasoning in McAlindin:
[W]e defined 'major life activities' as activities 'significant in the life of the average
person,' and explained that to determine whether a life activity is 'major,' courts should
examine 'the number of people who engage in' it, a standard that incorporates the
physical and social realities of peoples' lives. In particular, we concluded that
'interacting with others,' a quintessentially public, social function, constitutes a 'major
life activity.' . . . Thus, while major life activities are not confined 'to those with a
public, economic, or daily aspect,' ... skills with those aspects are quintessential parts of
the activities that are covered by the ADA.
792
[Vol. 31: 773, 2004] 'Interacting with Others' as a Major Life Activity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
McAlindin's impairment, he displayed a "pattern of withdrawal from public
places and family members," sufficient to raise a question of fact for a jury
on whether this substantially limited him in his ability to interact with
others. 
39
Additionally, the impairment must be substantial when compared to the
ability of "the average person in the general population."'' 40  The court
ultimately held that a plaintiff must show that his or her "relations with
others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems; for
example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to
communicate when necessary."' 4' Thus the court, in upholding McAlindin's
ADA claims for purposes of defeating summary judgment, effectively
created a new major life activity, which had not been officially recognized
by any court.
a. Courts Tending to Follow McAlindin
The only circuit court to expressly acknowledge McAlindin, and
somewhat suggest that it may be persuasive, was the Sixth Circuit in MX
Group, Inc. v. City of Covington.142 But even in acknowledging McAlindin,
the court failed to actually apply McAlindin reasoning, much less hold that
interacting with others is a major life activity. 143
Several district courts have followed reasoning similar to that in
McAlindin, identifying interacting with others as a major life activity under
certain circumstances. 44  For example, in Lemire v. Silva, 4 5 the court
concluded that "if defined broadly to include the most basic types of human
interactions," then interacting with others is certainly a major life activity,
thereby satisfying the requirement that major life activities are assessed by
their significance. 46  The court stated that "[t]he ability to interact with
Id. (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639; McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233-34).
139. See id. Thus, accepting "interacting with others" as a major life activity does not mean that
one is substantially limited in interacting with others simply because of problems at work; rather, the
individual must also be limited in getting along with others outside of work, in his or her personal,
everyday life.
140. Id. (citing the definitions in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2j)(1)(i) and § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)) ("courts must
consider the 'severity' of the impairment.").
141. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html)
(internal quotes omitted).
142. 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002).
143. id. at 337 (acknowledging that "it has been held that 'interacting with others,' is a major life
activity" (citing McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233)).
144. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The ability
to interact with others, like other recognized major life activities, is a basic function, necessary for
daily human existence"); Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
145. 104 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2000).
146. Id. at 86-87 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-42 (1998), for the proposition that
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others is an inherent part of what it means to be human."'' 47  Reasoning that
"[t]he ability to interact is thus both fundamental in itself and also essential
to contemporary life," the court concluded that interacting with others "is at
least as basic and as significant as the ability to learn or to work"-activities
more readily accepted by courts as major life activities.148
3. Courts Viewing Interacting with Others as a Component of the Major
Life Activities of Learning and Working
Thus, since Soileau and McAlindin, there have been various courts that
have followed the reasoning of either the First or Ninth Circuits to some
degree. Some have been more inclined or more reluctant to do so than
others. But there is another set of courts, which have not followed either
Soileau or McAlindin, but have applied individuals' limitations in their
ability to interact with others as a subset of the more recognized major life
activity of working. 49 While working is not as commonly accepted as the
major life activities of, for example, walking or breathing, several courts
have nonetheless construed it as subsuming the narrower category of
interacting with others.
50
In Emerson v. Northern States Power Co.,"' the plaintiff alleged that
she was substantially limited in "memory, concentration, and interacting
with others," as a result of brain injuries stemming from an accident. 52 The
Seventh Circuit refused to specifically decide the issue because the plaintiff
"the touchstone for determining the activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance").
147. Id. at 87.
148. Id. Inexplicably, the court did not even cite to Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d
12 (lst Cir. 1997), which presumably would be binding upon the court as decided by the First
Circuit.
149. Working is regarded by the EEOC as a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
Although the Supreme Court has declined to assess whether working is a major life activity in the
ADA context, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002), it has recognized
that working is a major life activity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act. Sch. Bd. of Nassau
County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1987). In Arline, an employer challenged the
validity of "working" as a major life activity under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. The employer argued
that to say that a condition impairing only the ability to work was a handicapping condition was to
make "a totally circular argument which lifts itself by its bootstraps." Id. However, the Court
asserted that such an argument is not circular, but direct. Id. The Court continued: "Congress
plainly intended the [Rehabilitation] Act to cover persons with a physical or mental impairment...
that substantially limited one's ability to work." Id. (emphasis added).
150. The Fifth Circuit aptly explained why it adopted working as a major life activity:
For many, working is necessary for self-sustenance or to support an entire family. The
choice of an occupation often provides the opportunity for self-expression and for
contribution to productive society. Importantly, most jobs involve some degree of social
interaction ... providing opportunities for collegial collaboration and friendship. For
those of us who are able to work and choose to work, our jobs are an important element
of how we define ourselves and how we are perceived by others. The inability to access
the many opportunities afforded by working constitutes exclusion from many of the
significant experiences of life.
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1999).
151. 256 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 511.
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did not "sufficiently develop[] her contentions on appeal."'' 53 However, it
considered all three activities collectively as ones that "feed into the major
life activities of learning and working," which it considered to be more
tangible activities. 15 4  The court, however, did not provide elaborate
reasoning to reach its conclusion; nor did it evaluate how each activity
independently fit into the activities of learning and working. 155
Further, in Whitney v. Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C.,15 6 the
plaintiff had experienced short-term dementia induced by chemotherapy.
157
The First Circuit concluded that her purported limitations in "thinking,
concentrating, organizing data, processing information, interacting with
others, and performing other everyday tasks such as sleeping and driving at
night," were part and parcel of working and learning.'58
The court noted without explanation that "[e]ven if each of these is a
distinct major life activity, we agree with the district court that all may be
reasonably subsumed within the broader context of working and
learning."' 5 9 The court did not distinguish or even acknowledge its previous
decision in Soileau.
60
In Moysis v. DTG Datanet,'6 1 the Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff
employee had "presented sufficient evidence of an actual disability" at the
time of termination. 162 Plaintiff had sustained a brain injury, resulting in
problems with concentration and short-term memory. 163 Although the court
found that the plaintiff could have continued to work for defendant
employer, jobs that mandated meeting new people could pose problems.' T 64
The court, without directly addressing the ability to get along with
others, noted that the Seventh Circuit had held that, "'the need for routine,'
as well as 'memory, concentration, and interacting with others [are]
activities that feed into the major life activities of learning and working.""165
The court added that this was not a situation where the plaintiffs condition
impaired a "'single aspect of a single job position. ' ,166 Rather, his limitation
in being able to meet and interact with new people was applicable to a broad
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. 258 F.3d 30 (lst Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 31.
158. Id. at 33 n.4.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. 278 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2002).
162. Id. at 825.
163. Id.
164. id.
165. id. (quoting Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2001)).
166. Id. (quoting Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm. Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2001)).
spectrum of jobs. 167 The fact that his limitation was so broadly striking was
crucial in determining that he was substantially limited in his "real work
opportunities."
'1
61
4. Courts Assuming Dubitante, for the Purpose of Applying the
Substantial Limitation Test in Accordance with Stipulation of the
Parties, that Interacting with Others Is a Major Life Activity
Several courts have not taken a definitive stance on the issue; rather they
have simply assumed that interacting with others is a major life activity and
applied the appropriate substantial limitation analysis.
169
B. What the Supreme Court Has Done
For several years after the ADA's enactment, the Supreme Court
seemed content to let the lower courts interpret the meaning of "disability,"
with its first disability interpretation occurring in 1998, holding that
individuals with HIV are covered by the ADA because it limits the major
life activity of reproduction. 70
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of
"interacting with others" as a major life activity, it has nonetheless supplied
helpful guidance in determining what a major life activity is generally, and
what constitutes a substantial limitation of a major life activity in the ADA
context.
With regard to regulations interpreting the meaning of "disability," the
Court has noted that there are two sources of regulatory guidance: the EEOC
regulations interpreting the ADA and the regulations interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.171
The Court has further noted that because 'disability' is contemplated by
the ADA "with respect to an individual,"' 72 that Congress intended the
existence of a disability to be determined in a case-by-case manner. 173 In
proving a substantial limitation, ADA claimants may not "merely submit
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1996), for the proposition
that the ADA is "concerned with preventing substantial personal hardship in the form of significant
reduction in a person's real work opportunities... [such that a] court must ask 'whether the
particular impairment constitutes for the particular person a significant barrier to employment"').
169. See, e.g., Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The EEOC
Guidance is not, however, controlling authority. We will nevertheless assume for the sake of
argument that, along with learning and sleeping, thinking and interacting with others constitute
major life activities." (citations omitted)); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350,
354 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (expressing doubts that "socializing qualifies as a major life activity");
Presta v. S.E.P.T.A., No. CIV.A. 97CIV.2338, 1998 WL 310735 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1998).
170. See Smith, supra note 15, at 50 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
171. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002). See also Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (assuming that EEOC regulations are valid and applying
them); supra Section I (discussing deference to be given to the EEOC).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
173. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198.
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evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment."'' 74 Rather, they must
"prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation
[caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience... is
substantial."'
'I7
Further, "[tihe plain meaning of the word major denotes comparative
importance and suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an activity's
inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.' 76  The Bragdon
Court noted that the term "major life activity" is very broad and includes
activities that are private in character. 1
77
More recently, the Supreme Court decided four major ADA cases in
2002.178 The rulings tended to favor employers. 179 Is this recent trend an
awakening for ADA and EEOC advocates that the envelope is not going to
be pushed much further?
180
In January 2002, the Court limited ADA protection of employees with
carpal tunnel syndrome and other work-related impairments, holding that an
individual's impairment, in order to substantially limit a major life activity,
must pervade into the life of the individual generally, and may not only limit
the activity while the individual is working. 181
Three months later, the Court seemed to favor employee seniority rights
over ADA protections of disabled workers. 82 In June the Court upheld an
EEOC regulation permitting employers to reject job applicants who have
medical conditions that might be inflamed by workplace conditions.
183
Lastly, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for punitive
damages in private ADA suits.
8 4
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether the ability to
get along with others is a major life activity. The Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in response to the Ninth Circuit's decision in McAlindin was
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)) (emphasis added).
176. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. The Bragdon Court rejected an attempt to confine major life activities to "those with a
public, economic, or daily aspect." Id. at 639.
178. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73
(2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002): Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
179. See cases supra note 178.
180. See Smith, supra notes 15-16 (discussing Justice O'Connor's recent speech regarding the
ADA).
181. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("[T]o be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people's daily lives.").
182. See US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
183. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
184. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
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denied, 185 and remains to be the only Petition for Writ of Certiorari
submitted to the Court on this issue.
C. What the Supreme Court Will Likely Do
The Court will likely not hear many more cases where the primary issue
is whether a particular activity is a major life activity. The Court likely feels
that it has set forth enough language for lower courts to apply in assessing
disability in the context of the ADA. In addition to the existing language
and instructions on determining if an activity is to be regarded as "major,"
there exists an additional restraint on the ADA plaintiff: passing the
substantial limitation test. 186  Between convincing a court that interacting
with others is a major life activity, and further convincing the trier of fact
that the individual is substantially limited in interacting with others, due to
an actual impairment, there are significant barriers ADA claimants must
overcome.
The intent of the Supreme Court is that disability is to be construed
narrowly, such that frivolous, fraudulent, and unjust claims are not
recognized. 87 Because of this and the Court's recent tightening of the reigns
over possible future claimants, the Court is likely to patiently see where its
recent holdings will take the ADA.
However, with respect to "interacting with others" specifically, because
the varying interpretations are still in disarray within the lower courts, the
Court may be interested in deciding if it is a major life activity, thereby
clearing the air for better and more efficient application of the law.
V. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH ACCEPTING INTERACTING WITH OTHERS AS
A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
A. The "Essential Functions" Obstacle
Is interacting with others not simply an "essential function" of almost
every job, thus precluding it as a major life activity because the individual
185. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1243 (2000).
186. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). Specifically, the
determination of disability is "not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual." Id.
187. See id. at 197. Further, the Court noted that "[i]f Congress intended everyone with a physical
impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult
manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans [reflecting 43 million] would
surely have been much higher." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(1)). But see Charles B. Craver, The
Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination Provisions of The Americans With Disabilities
Act, 18 LAB. LAw 417, 442 (2003) (describing the Court as the "Supreme Legislature," which has
ignored both legislative findings and purpose in severely limiting the types of plaintiffs who qualify
as disabled under the ADA).
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would thus not be otherwise qualified to work if he or she cannot perform
the essential function of interacting with others? 188
Courts have determined, both pre- and post-ADA, that certain functions
are generally essential to jobs, such that if the employee cannot fulfill them,
then the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA does not protect him or her. 89 More
recently, it has been reasoned that getting along with others is
unquestionably an essential function of basically every job. 190 Thus, if
interacting with others is an essential function, then a limitation of such is
not covered by the ADA. But, if interacting with others is not an essential
function of a particular type of job (i.e. professional graffiti remover inside a
cave), then what conceivable situation would arise where that employee
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). The ADA protects only those "who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." Id. Further, "consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential." Id. "[E]ssential functions" means the
"fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.
The term 'essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(1) (2003).
189. See Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 674-75 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that
"[t]echnical skills and experience are not the only essential requirements of a job"). Here the court
cited cases that had reasoned similarly:
See Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 441-42 (6th Cir. 1991) ("at least
the ability to get along with supervisors and co-workers" was essential function of job as
tool room attendant); Mancini v. General Electric Co., 820 F.Supp. 141, 147 (D.
Vt.1993) ("ability to follow the orders of superiors is an essential function of any
position"); Pickard v. Widnall, 1994 WL 851282, *9 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 15, 1994) (No. C-
3-94-40) ("mental and emotional stability" was essential job function for military
position); Johnston v. Morrison, 849 F.Supp. 777, 778 (N.D.Ala. 1994) (waitress who was
unable to handle pressures of working on crowded nights or memorizing frequent menu
changes was unable to perform essential functions of job); cf Bento v. LTO. Corp. of
Rhode Island, 599 F. Supp. 731, 742-43 (D.R.I. 1984) (although there is "no question that
plaintiff ... is qualified to do the job, at least in the sense of knowing how to perform it,"
he is not necessarily "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
More specifically, an employer may reasonably believe that an employee known to have
a paranoia about the plant manager is not able to perform his job. Cf Voytek v. University
of California, 1994 WL 478805, *15. 6 A.D.D. 1137, 1161 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 1994)
(No. C-9203465 EFL) (holding that employee was legally denied re-employment after
period of disability where he "could not continue to perform all of the tasks assigned to
him," due in part to "the ongoing conflict with his supervisor").
Grenier, 70 F.3d at 674-75.
190. The court explained:
Since getting along with others and accepting supervision are crucial to evervjob except,
perhaps, to a lighthouse keeper. they are certainly essential functions. If, therefore, a
person's disability prevents her from being cooperative and amenable to supervision, and
a employer cannot reasonably accommodate that disability, then the disabled person
cannot perform an essential function of her position and her discharge is appropriate
despite her disability. But, if the disability claimed has nothing to do with being
cooperative, then the ADA is completely irrelevant to her discharge.
Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 271 F. Supp. 2d 165, 172 (D.D.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). In summation, the court recognized the very basic but oft forgotten fact that "[dlisabled
persons and their employers are not covered in every aspect of their relationship by the ADA." Id.
would be fired, or otherwise discriminated against, because of his or her
inability to interact with others, as required for an ADA claim?
B. Congressional Intent Trumps Judicial Proactivism (and, of Course, the
EEOC)191
A primary catalyst for enacting the ADA was rooted in the idea that a
deplorable stigma exists towards the disabled.' 92  In this sense, the
deplorable stigma irrationally judges another individual based on a set of
physical or mental features of that person that are not part of the proverbial
"inner person." This stigma could be characterized as an impediment to
getting along with others, particularly if those who attach the stigma are
excluding them or choosing not to interact with them because of their
personal bias against them. Thus, it could be argued that the inability to
interact with others is the basis for the stigma, which is the foundation of
such discriminatory attitudes and practices.1 93
Accordingly, not being able to interact with others in this context is the
root of the purpose of the ADA, and is not an outward manifestation of an
individual's impairment. With this in mind, the fact that irrational feelings
towards an individual, such as having a prejudice against an individual in a
wheelchair because of ignorant notions or generalizations about individuals
in wheelchairs, are based on ignorance in perceiving or accepting the
outward manifestations of physical or mental impairments, is why
"interacting with others" is a problematic legal issue. 94 A stigma towards
an individual with whom it is hard to get along is based on rational human
191. However, congressional intent prevails only when it is unambiguous. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Obviously, the fact that there is a
severe circuit split on the issue of this Comment proves that Congress used less than clear language
in drafting the ADA. See supra note 16 (discussing Justice O'Connor's belief that the ADA was
sloppily constructed); Part III (discussing deference levels of administrative agencies when
congressional intent is less than clear because of ambiguous statutory language). But, despite less
than clear statutory language, congressional intent may be inferred where appropriate.
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (7) (2000), explaining that:
historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and,
despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; [i]ndividuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society[.]
Id.
193. The primary purpose of the ADA is "to diminish or to eliminate the stereotypical thought
processes, the thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar those with
disabilities from participating fully in the Nation's life, including the workplace." US Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)-(b)).
194. But see Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1139, 1168-75 (2002) (arguing for recognition
of interacting with others as a major life activity, and suggesting that claims based on mental illness
are rejected by courts more often than claims based on physical impairments because of "the
significant discomfort that many in society experience in the presence [of] mental illness").
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tendencies to not want to be around someone who is unstable, abrasive,
argumentative, or generally "unlikable" because of the way that individual
acts or treats those around him or her.
Thus, interacting with others naturally includes behavior towards others,
a factor that none of the other commonly accepted major life activities
considers. It is reasonable to infer that courts' reluctance to apply
"interacting with others" in the ADA employment context is because it is
difficult to say that the congressional purpose behind the ADA prohibits
stigmas that are based on natural human tendencies, rather than the
traditional "bad reasons."
VI. CONCLUSION
Because there is no clear answer to what deference is owed to EEOC
regulations, nor its compliance manuals and other interpretive guidance,
whether the EEOC is authoritative when it declares that "interacting with
others" is a major life activity is less than obvious. The federal courts have
reached differing conclusions, doing their best to balance the EEOC,
congressional intent, and the often vague language of the Supreme Court.
Whether or not the Supreme Court will choose to address the issue
remains to be seen. In any event, the First Circuit in Soileau has offered the
most persuasive and logical reasoning of the lower courts. The "ability to
interact with others" is an elastic phrase, and it is difficult to imagine courts
being able to interpret what exactly it means, in light of the fact that courts
are accustomed to adjudicating issues where the major life activities in
question are seeing, walking, breathing, or some other activity that is
concrete, outwardly and quantitatively manifested.
Further, arguing that being substantially limited in one's ability to
interact with others begs the question of the purpose of the ADA itself,
creating an illogical interpretation of congressional intent. Rep.
Dannemeyer forecasted that "perverse and unintended results will
proliferate" from interpreting the ADA.195 Is that what is happening?
Bryan P. Stephenson'96
195. See supra note 9.
196. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2004. This Comment is dedicated to
my mother, Ellen, to my hero and father, the late M.J. Stephenson, Ph.D., and to Elijah Stephenson
and Layla Hoffen, who represent a new and better future. In addition, I would like to thank Eugene
Pickel and Dr. Gary Fulks, who likely do not realize the significant impact that they have had on my
life and education.
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